In this Appendix, we provide conditions that ensure that the allocation (U sb , q sb 1 , u sb 1 , ε sb ) characterized in the Proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 through a set of necessary conditions is indeed the solution. This first requires that the principal's problem is concave and second that the rent profile U sb is convex (which from Lemma 1 is a sufficient condition for implementability). In the rest of this Section, we provide upper bounds on the degree of risk-aversion in the CARA case that ensure that those conditions hold. Beyond the CARA case, we demonstrate that these conditions always hold when β is small enough.
• Concavity of the principal's problem in the CARA case. We start with the special case of CARA utility function. Using the expression of w(z, ε) given in the text, we obtain: ϕ(ζ, ε) = − 1 τ ln(1 − τ ζ) + 1 τ ln(η(τ, ε)).
Inserting into (A7) yields the following expression of the Hamiltonian:
H(U, q 1 , u 1 , ε, λ, θ 1 ) = f (θ 1 ) S 1 (q 1 ) − θ 1 q 1 − (1 − β)u 1 + β τ ln 1 − τ U − (1 − β)u 1 β (O.1)
For the value taken by the costate variable, namely λ(θ 1 ) = F (θ 1 ) obtained from (A13) at the allocation (U sb , q sb 1 , u sb 1 , ε sb ) characterized by necessary conditions above, we now proceed by computing a partially maximized HamiltonianĤ(U, q 1 , ε, λ(θ 1 ), θ 1 ) = max u 1 H(U, q 1 , u 1 , ε, λ(θ 1 ), θ 1 ). We shall check that
Inserting this value into the maximand gives us the following expression of the partially maximized HamiltonianĤ(U, q 1 , ε, λ(θ 1 ), θ 1 ):
It is straightforward to check thatĤ(U, q 1 , ε, λ(θ 1 ), θ 1 ) is now concave in (U, q 1 , ε) provided that the following condition holds:
This condition is satisfied when the degree of risk aversion τ is small compared to S 1 .
• Concavity of the principal's problem beyond the CARA case. We proceed as above; the difficulty being now that closed-form solutions are not available. To perform a partial optimization with respect to u 1 , we have to solve:
The necessary first-order condition for optimality gives us:
Observe that the function w z (z, ε)−
is decreasing in z since w zz < 0 from the concavity of v, λ(θ 1 ) = F (θ 1 ) ≥ 0 (from (A13) ) and w zzz > 0 when v > 0 (a condition implied by Assumption 1). Hence, the necessary condition above is also sufficient.
We can thus rewrite the partially maximized HamiltonianĤ(U, q 1 , ε, λ(θ 1 ), θ 1 ) as:
Now, observe that the curvature ofẑ(q 1 , ε, θ 1 ) only depends on w (and thus u). Proceeding as in the CARA case above, the concavity ofĤ(U, q 1 , ε, λ(θ 1 ), θ 1 ) in (U, q 1 , ε) is thus ensured provided that S 1 and S 2 are sufficiently negative or provided that β is small enough.
• Incentive compatibility. We start with the CARA case because of its importance for the main text. Observe that, for the allocation (U sb , q sb 1 , u sb 1 , ε sb ), the incentive compatibility constraint (12) can be rewritten as:
Differentiating (18) with respect to θ 1 , we observe that:
This condition, together with the concavity requirement (O.3) and Assumption 2 yieldsq sb 1 (θ 1 ) < 0. Differentiating now the right-hand side of (O.5) with respect to θ 1 , we obtain:
where the strict inequality follows from the fact thatq sb 1 (θ 1 ) < 0 and Assumption 2. Hence, U sb is always convex so that the sufficiency condition in Lemma 1 holds.
Beyond the CARA case, differentiating (15) with respect to θ 1 shows that the optimal output q sb 1 is necessarily strictly decreasing when β is small enough and Assumption 2 holds. Hence, U sb is again convex as required by the sufficiency condition in Lemma 1.
II. First-Period Risk Aversion
Suppose that the agent also evaluates the first-period returns according to the same utility function v(·) as in the second period. We first analyze the case of a durable project. Then, and for the sake of completeness, we also report on the case of a non-durable, i.e., q 1 only arises in the first period. For simplicity and under both scenarios, we suppose that θ 2 remains common knowledge.
A. The case of a durable first-period project
The next proposition shows that the Income Effect disappears as suggested in the text. The principal finds no value in shifting payments towards the second period. As a result, the basic service is produced at its Baron-Myerson level.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that θ 2 remains common knowledge and that the first-period project is durable. The optimal contract has the following features:
• Constant profit over time for the durable:
• The durable is produced at its Baron-Myerson level:
To show these results, observe that the principal's expected payoff can now be written as:
Omitting the sufficiency condition for incentive compatibility given by (A3) and focusing on a so called relaxed optimization problem, the principal's problem is to maximize (O.8) among all possible allocations (U(θ 1 ), u 1 (θ 1 ), q 1 (θ 1 )) subject to the necessary condition for first-period incentive compatibility (22) and the firm's participation constraint (A6) that again turns out to be binding at the optimum.
• Optimizing w.r.t. q 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) gives q sb 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = q f b 2 (θ 2 ) for all (θ 1 , θ 2 ). Therefore, we may simplify the expression of the principal's payoff from the add-on to:
Equipped with this expression, and denoting by λ the costate variable for (22) we can write the Hamiltonian for the principal's problem as:
We shall assume that H(U, q 1 , u 1 , λ, θ 1 ) is concave in (U, q 1 , u 1 ) and use the Pontryagin Principle to get optimality conditions satisfied by an extremal arc (U sb (θ 1 ), u sb 1 (θ 1 ), q sb 1 (θ 1 )).
• Costate variable. λ(θ 1 ) is continuous, piecewise continuously differentiable and such that:
where the second-period profit is
• Transversality condition. Because (A6) is binding at the optimum, this condition is:
(O.12) λ(θ 1 ) = 0.
• First-order optimality condition w.r.t. u 1 :
• First-order optimality condition w.r.t. q 1 :
(O.14)
A solution to (O.13) is given by:
Inserting into (22) and (O.11) yields respectively:
Inserting into (O.10) and using again (O.16) gives:
Integrating and using (O.12) we obtain:
Inserting into (O.14) and again taking into account (O.16) gives (O.7).
B. The case of a non-durable first-period project
The next proposition shows that the principal wants to push profits for the first-period project into the second period even if the first-period project is not a durable one. This project is produced below the first-best level.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that θ 2 remains common knowledge and that the first-period project's surplus and costs only arise in the first period. The optimal contract has the following features.
• The first-period project is rewarded in both periods but with declining profits:
with an equality only in the case of risk neutrality.
• The first-period production is:
We first notice that, with a short-term project, the envelope condition for incentive compatibility becomes:
The principal's expected payoff also takes into account that surplus and cost for q 1 only arise in the first period and have to be weighted accordingly:
Omitting the sufficiency condition for incentive compatibility given by (A3) and focusing on a so called relaxed optimization problem, the principal's problem is to maximize (O.21) among all possible allocations (U(θ 1 ), u 1 (θ 1 ), q 1 (θ 1 )) subject to the necessary condition for first-period incentive compatibility (O.20) and the firm's participation constraint (A6) that again turns out to be binding at the optimum.
Denoting by λ the costate variable for (O.20) we can write the Hamiltonian for the principal's problem as:
From (O.23) and (O.24), λ(θ 1 ) satisfies:
Inserting into (O.25) immediately gives (O.18). Finally, inserting (O.27) into (O.26) yields (O.19).

III. Robustness: Lumpy Add-On with Continuous Costs
In the main text, the analysis has been simplified by assuming that the cost of the uncertain add-on was drawn from a binary distribution. Although this assumption allows us to consider the consequences of an endogenous background risk on earlier incentives in a stripped down manner, a more symmetric treatment requires the cost of the add-on to take a continuum of values. We thus assume that θ 2 is distributed according to a continuous and atomless cumulative distribution F 2 (θ 2 ) (with a positive density f 2 (θ 2 )) on Θ 2 = θ 2 , θ 2 . The technical difficulty pointed out by both Salanié (1990) and Laffont and Rochet (1998) for such models is that, even in simpler static settings, complicated areas of bunching might arise for the optimal level of add-on when the degree of risk aversion is sufficiently large.
One way to extend our analysis without falling into such technicalities is to consider a setting where the second-period project is lumpy. Possible examples would be the expansion of an existing infrastructure, or the addition of services into new geographical areas or new segments of demand. This add-on, whose fixed value is denoted by S 2 , is only pursued when the principal pays a price that covers the cost θ 2 . Bunching thus takes a simpler form: The project is only done for costs below a threshold. We also assume that θ 2 < S 2 < θ 2 , meaning that implementing the add-on is not always efficient even under complete information. This assumption stands in contrast to our previous analysis where an Inada condition imposed on the second-period surplus implied that the add-on was always valuable and thus always provided even in the second-best scenario. It nevertheless still implies that the firm's second-period returns remain risky with part of the risk coming from the possibility to give up the project if it turns out to be too costly.
The firm's expected second-period payoff with an arbitrary price p ∈ Θ 2 for the add-on can now be written as:
Observe also that an increase in p makes it more likely to implement the add-on. It thus shifts the distribution of second-period profits in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance and this reduces the firm's second-period marginal utility of income since:
Following the same procedure as previously, we may also re-define two new functions
wz(z,p) w p (z, p) and ϕ(ζ, p) such that ζ = w(ϕ(ζ, p), p). 2 Assumption 1 then ensures that H(·) remains non-negative.
second period. Indeed, at the optimal contract, we have:
As a result and by a mechanism which is now familiar, output distortions for the basic service are also less pronounced than in the Baron and Myerson (1982) outcome:
(O.33) S 1 (q sb 1 (θ 1 )) = θ 1 + F (θ 1 ) f (θ 1 ) (1 − β + βw z (u sb 1 (θ 1 ) + y sb (θ 1 ), p sb (θ 1 ))).
Because now the Substitution Effect dominates, relaxing the firm's first-period incentive constraint calls for decreasing the second-period price below its level in the absence of a first-period incentive problem. Indeed, the following condition holds:
Even though details differ, there is a common thread to this setting and our previous model. To isolate the first-period agency problem from the second-period one, the principal makes the second-period project less relevant either by reducing its size (in our main model) or by reducing the likelihood of its implementation in the present setting.
PROOFS :
Trade in the second period occurs only when θ 2 ≤ p(θ 1 ). Adapting the general expression (1) to the present context, the principal's expected payoff becomes: E θ 1 (S 1 (q 1 (θ 1 )) − θ 1 q 1 (θ 1 ) − u 1 (θ 1 ) + βE θ 2 ((S 2 − p(θ 1 ))F 2 (p(θ 1 )) − y(θ 1 ))) , which can again be re-expressed as:
E θ 1 S 1 (q 1 (θ 1 )) − θ 1 q 1 (θ 1 ) − (1 − β)u 1 (θ 1 ) + βE θ 2 ((S 2 − p(θ 1 ))F 2 (p(θ 1 ))) (O.35)
In terms of first-period incentive compatibility, (12) is readily replaced with:
